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Elliott Visconsi, Lines of Equity: Literature and the Origins of Law in Later Stuart England (Cornell
University Press: 2008).
Pat Gudridge
This is a book about the fictionalization of the origins of law in later Stuart England. My focus is
on crucial literary texts such as John Milton's Paradise Lost and John Dryden's Indian Emperour,
works devoted to demanding of the audience a set of structured interpretive deliberations about the
first principles of government, the charismatic utterance of law, and the transition from savagery to
civility. At the heart of such an intellectual program is the norm and practice of equity.... Equity is
a moral principle (equal justice, fairness), an interpretive method (summoning the original intention
or spirit of a law in order to judge fully particular acts or events), and a gesture of sovereign mercy
(relaxing the rigorous letter of the law in order to ensure justice). For the writers I study, equity is
habit of thought that may be cultivated through fictional methods. ... I take as given the claim ...
that in the later Stuart period, serious literary texts are a crucial language for the public constitution
of the legal norms and conceptions of sovereignty, subjecthood, and political authority. Moreover,
I share the view that literary texts are often the most effective and lasting language for explaining
and legitimating legal regimes. (1-2)
This is a book I like a lot in part because of who - professionally - Elliott Visconsi is. He wrote the book while
an assistant professor of English. Lines of Equity is careful tenure track work. Visconsi announces right at the
beginning ("I take as given") that he is working within a field already mapped (naming and footnoting his
predecessors in the passage I delete.) And he was also an assistant professor of English at Yale - making his
way, therefore, within one of the most established, celebrated, central English departments in American
academia. There is nothing radical, it appears - or not much - in Visconsi's project. Constitutional thinking is,
apparently, a pretty much accepted starting point for exploring the organization and power of literary works.
Professor Visconsi cheerfully announces on his Yale webpage that he will "spend a year studying US and
comparative constitutional law at Yale Law School courtesy of a Mellon Foundation New Directions
Fellowship. The major focus of my current research touches on the cultural and legal history of the separation
of church and state...."
Those of us who think that constitutions should be thought about, written about, generally argued over, by
reading legal documents like constitutions (for example) or judicial opinions, supplemented (but mostly only
supplemented) by some references to history or political theory or economics or sociology (for example) have to
wonder: What are we to make of our new cousins (new to many of us anyway, I think)? Perhaps they are
safely far removed, we will wave cheerfully when we notice them, but don't really need to take them seriously.
Milton and Dryden and friends, after all, are safely famously long dead - right subjects for historical
appreciation of whatever form, but not part of the present in which we think ourselves to be participating. But
the problem - and this is another reason why I like Visconsi's book a lot - is that Visconsi's ways of putting
things really do resemble ours (or some of ours) quite a bit.
Consider this passage in Elliott Visconsi's discussion of Paradise Lost - both bravura and dauntingly English
professor-ish:
Let us recall here that equity is, in early modern political and rhetorical theory, the act of
summoning the spirit of an utterance to create worldly justice. It is both a political norm to be
practiced in good government and an inherently personal (and sometimes dangerously) subjective
deliberation. The two prongs - the public and private strains - of equity are reflected in the formal
structure of Paradise Lost. On the one hand, Milton offers a heterodox, unstable invitation to deep
and challenging deliberations over the spirit of divine utterance - this is the paideic method with
which Milton corrects his wayward audience or cultivates revolutionary readers. ... [Bow to
Stanley Fish omitted.] On the other hand, the poem makes an unambiguous, strident, and orthodox
argument for divine equity. ... [T]his rhetorical (rather than hermeneutic) appeal is the space
within which Milton argues for equity as governmental norm. Taken together, the interpretive and
the rhetorical appeal in Paradise Lost are part of a broader commitment to equity as governmental
norm and personal ethos. The poem proposes simultaneously, and without contradiction, a private
language of unstable, heterodox, individual deliberation and a normative public language.... (99-
100)
Visconsi's Milton is not quite Mike Seidman, of course - but there's plainly a family resemblance. (Louis
Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory
of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006 (1987).) What if we acknowledge the resemblance as something other
than accidental - just another grilled cheese sandwich picture of Jesus? What if legal thinking about
constitutions is understood to overlap literary thinking about constitutions? This is not an entirely surprising
question, of course. Sometime ago, Robert Ferguson introduced us to the idea of "the literature of public
documents," and put the Constitution at the core of this canon. But his reading was readily bracketed as
history. So too Visconsi's if we want it to be. What if we don't?
I don't mean that we should treat Paradise Lost, say, as necessarily a precursor text (although that may make
sense.) Rather, I think that the idea of the constitution as literary may have implications for the idea of the
constitution as legal.
* Reading in a context we recognize as literary, we are entirely comfortable placing any particular text
within a larger stream - whether precursors or post-productions - reading each individual presentation as
both impressed upon and impressing upon others, more or less independently of chronological order,
seeking to catch hold of some especially resonant gloss. There is no need for "living constitution"
fictions and every possibility of inter-relating constitutional documents as such with cognates - say, the
Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's several masterpieces. Cascades of Supreme Court opinions,
epochal statutes, and the like.
* Literary culture, we know, coexists provocatively (overlaps) popular culture. Influences - either way -
may be both oblique and real. (We all remember, don't we, Meryl Streep's oration on blue sweaters in
Devil Wore Prada?) Highly worked, in many ways esoteric, academic and judicial constitutional
readings might be understood similarly - not as opposites in some sense, but as sometimes mutually
influencing, interacting constitutional streams. The place of the great civil rights marches of the 1960s -
obviously in some sense constitutional, but pretty much ignored as such in much - not all, obviously
enough - academic and judicial constitutional writing - becomes clearer: as constructions, assemblies,
demonstrations, among other things, of the form and function of provocation as a medium of free speech.
Influence may also run back and forth: "One person, one vote" is first of all a formula encoding a notably
complex and controversial reading of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment; it becomes foundational
within popular constitutional culture; by the time of Bush v. Gore it appears to have acquired a
significance (resisted also, to be sure) independent of its judicial origin, now become rhetorically
elemental, the constitutional equivalent of an emoticon.
Literary reading is play, it seems. But part of the accomplishment of Visconci and his predecessors is a
demonstration that this play elaborates sometimes within highly charged political and social scenes, as
acts within those scenes, as acts therefore not always without consequence. Play looks like law - like law
looks to Austin, Cover, etc. Albion Tourgee introduces the idea of "color-blind" in a novel, carries it over
into a brief, the phrase (of course) then taken over by Justice Harlan in the Plessy dissent, in the late
twentieth century and even now recast as incendiary, a flash point fueling and refueling repeatedly
blooming bursts of constitutional, political, and social conflict.
Elliott Visconsi's book provokes, offers a new background, may well change our sense of what we take for
granted. I like this book a lot.
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